Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles, myth or threat?
China's second artillery, DF 21D ASBM
China and Russia have hundreds of ASBM, and they have been regularly marketed as making the carrier group obsolete. The concept is not new, and it is taken seriously by every Navy Admiral, but is it really the ultimate weapon?
A carrier battle group is usually defended by several destroyers and frigates equipped with hundreds of long-range surface-to-air missiles, very good at intercepting targets flying at high supersonic speed.
ASBM are usually converted short or intermediate range nuclear ballistic missiles, reaching hypersonic speeds up to Mach 8-15 above the atmosphere.
This incredible speed makes them very difficult to intercept.
Challenges : speed, heat and targeting
Chinese anti-access area denial (A2AD) capabilities
To hit a moving target at sea is a difficult task; accurate target position and speed need to be fed to the weapon before launch and/or during its flight to ensure a hit.
The Houthi scored a few direct hits against undefended cargo ships with their short range ballistic missiles (<500km) thanks to precise targeting information from maritime traffic websites and later from intelligence provided by an Iranian navy ship patrolling close to Djibouti.
As they are short range and relatively low tech, their altitude and speed are within the engagement envelope of most recent warships, when they are available.
HGV trajectory (red) versus ballistic trajectory (white/green)
HGV trajectory is lower, and it can manoeuvre, making it more difficult to detect and to predict its impact and interception point.
China relies on longer range ASBM, 1600km DF-21D and 4000km DF 26B. Both are flying at very high altitude and hypersonic speed (Mach 8-15).
One system identified as a major headache is the DF-ZF Hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV). This ASBM variant releases a vehicle flying at a lower trajectory. Its flies and manoeuvers at hypersonic speed at relatively low altitude (20 to 80km), making the interception an extremely difficult endeavour.
But at high speeds, the friction of the atmosphere causes enormous heat and creates ionisation blockage. These physical processes blind any sensors the missile can carry until it slows down to supersonic speed at an altitude of 3 to 5 km, leaving only a few seconds for target acquisition by onboard sensors and making them vulnerable to interception.
Even with very precise targeting data, a direct hit on a moving aircraft carrier will be a challenge.
China does have access to a constellation of military satellites to track most ships, but in case of a confrontation, they would be targeted by the myriad of means available to the US Space Command.
Moreover, China never actually tested these weapons against moving targets. Experts think they would be put to a much better use against ground military infrastructure (air force base, logistics hubs).
Ballistic missile defense
The US Navy already has 33 Aegis ships equipped with missiles capable of intercepting Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM) at an altitude of 160km, well outside the atmosphere.
Ballistic missile defense concept with submerged prepositionned weapons silos
To counter Hypersonic Glide Vehicule (HGV), Northrop Grumman is developing a Glide Phase Interceptor (GDI). This hypersonic ammunition will be compatible with the existing Aegis equipped fleet to protect them from these HGV.
Other nations also have the same system. Japan, with 8 ships, and many European navies, will soon be joining this exclusive club with an evolution of PAAM system, the Aster 30 Block 1NT.
Although never foolproof, any carrier group going into battle will be protected by several of these highly capable ships.
The offense is the best defense
ASBM missiles are mounted on 10-wheeler trucks to reduce their vulnerability, but they are difficult to hide and will be quite high in the priority list of targets of any long-range stealth bomber or submarine-launched cruise missile in the US arsenal.
Today, the Pentagon has only 8 long-range stealth B2 bombers designed in the 80’s, but its replacement, the new B21 raider, is being rushed into service.
If the USAF can field 100 of them and use them in a combination of swarms of stealth attack drones and cruise missiles, they can be used to clear the way until it is safe for old-school Carrier Battle Group to get closer.
Targeting works both ways.
B21 Raider, the first of many?
Laser defense, not today, maybe later…
HELIOS
Some media are making a lot of noise around the first laser turrets deployed on ships as a future solution against ASBM.
They are completely inadequate today. They can only be used in clear weather, at very close range (a few km at most).
Due to their extreme high speed, ASBMs are protected by a heatshield designed to endure extreme temperatures during reentry, making them highly resilient against current lasers.
The most advanced system fielded today is the USN 60kw HELIOS. It is designed as a short-range, cost-effective weapon against drones.
Direct energy weapons will need to be considerably more powerful to be able to intercept hypersonic missiles at 100 km.
A new class of ship, able to generate the necessary energy will be needed (hello! fusion reactor!)
We are stuck with kinetic and explosive ammunition for a few more decades.
ASBM are not to be underestimated
An aircraft carrier being a capital ship will always be heavily defended. This is why the Soviet Red Fleet deployed hundreds of submarines, bombers and ships carrying carrier-killer missiles and torpedoes to deal with them.
China over the past 25 years has created a multi-layered anti-access area denial (A2AD) capability, with one objective; to prevent the US Navy carrier group from getting close enough to launch its aircraft against mainland China.
The ASBM force is an additional layer that might very well be used to strike a carrier group as part of a synchronized attack involving submarines, long-range bombers and dozens of ASBM, in an attempt to saturate the fleet defenses hoping for multiple hits by any of these munitions.
An ASBM strike needs to be recognised as a threat, but it is no magic weapon, it is just another system designed to disrupt US Navy maritime supremacy.
Forcing your enemy to funnel part of its limited budget to counter a new threat at great cost, is in itself a victory.
This might well be a very clever Chinese deception in the ever-lasting competition between the sword and the shield.
Let's hope we never find it the hard way.
Fleet protective screens against surface and bomber attack
China would also use its ASBM and submarine launched cruise missile to attack the carrier
