The end of the Moskva!
Moskva anti-aircraft cruiser from the 1970s
The main characters involved in the loss of this capital ship will probably remain silent for several years, as this conflict is far from over, and hardware and tactics are likely to be used again. Still, a number of known factors can shed light on what may have caused the biggest ship loss in wartime since the Falkland.
Ship design
Without carrier groups comparable to NATO’s, the Soviets had to develop ships powerful enough to survive at sea without air cover.
2 types of specialised vessels were designed in the 70s. The first, the "Orlan" project, gave rise to the Kirov class (photo below). A 30,000-ton nuclear-powered battlecruiser, one of which is still in service, while a second is currently being refitted.
Fourth Kirov class nuclear battle cruiser “Peter the Great”
These ships were designed to escort Soviet surface groups, but their development was so complex and costly that a smaller project "Atlant" was also built. The first ship in this class, the Slava (Glory), was built in 1976 at the Nikolaev shipyard in Ukraine.
She was commissioned in 1983, then mothballed in 1990, before being renamed the Moskva in 1995 in the new Russian navy.
By the mid-1980s, the Red Banners Fleet had, at least on paper, 3 Slava cruisers, 3 Kirov battlecruisers, and a Kara Class destroyer, all equipped with the S300 long-range SAM system.
These ships combined considerable anti-ship and anti-aircraft firepower.
Equipment
When a NATO anti-aircraft frigate or destroyer had a maximum of 1 medium long-range missile system and 1 close-in defence system, a Soviet unit like the Moskva carried three defensive curtains, often duplicated to engage as many targets as possible simultaneously.
This redundancy also ensures that at least one system is operational in the event of a breakdown.
Air defence
3 defensive systems, each capable of engaging several targets simultaneously:
SAN-6 ( S300F) long-range system with 2 types of missile for a total of 64 vertical tubes.
2 SAN-4 short-range systems with 40 missiles.
6 AKM 30mm Gatling gun with a 5000 rounds per minute rate of fire, used in pairs.
A Soviet surface group would deploy a minimum of 2 ships with the SAN-6 for area air defence.
To defend its carrier group, the US Navy in the mid 80’s could deploy some fifteen nuclear-powered anti-aircraft cruisers, as well as fifteen new Ticonderoga-type cruisers equipped with the brand-new Aegis system, which 40 years later is still a benchmark in anti-aircraft defence.
Early Aegis ships lacked the vertical launch system, but they revolutionised air defence with a very powerful electronically steered radar (AN/ SPY-1) managed by a computer able to track and engage more than 40 targets. This system has been adopted by many navies around the world (Spain, Japan, South Korea, etc.…).
The French Navy in the 1980s had 7 air defence ships equipped with either their Masurca or the American medium-range Tartar. Both systems dated back to the early 60s, and despite regular upgrades, they were unable to defend the fleet effectively against a saturation attack by Russian supersonic anti-ship missiles. These systems were designed to engage 2 targets with 2 missiles each. The fleet's close-in self-defence relied on Crotale or Mistral missiles. To survive, French ships had to take refuge under the cover of an American air group as quickly as possible.
The Royal Navy had very similar systems, but the lessons of the Falkland War acted as a catalyst; Royal Navy ships received a significant boost in their defence capability with the introduction of the phalanx/goalkeeper CIWS, and short-range Seawolves missiles.
It wasn't until the introduction of the European-built PAAMS system for the Horizon class and type 46 destroyers, at the turn of the century that the French, Italian and Royal Navy eventually fielded a system as capable as the Aegis to protect their respective fleet.
French sailors compare this generational leap to going from a shotgun to a Gatling gun!
Long-range anti-ship missiles
The ship's offensive punch is based on 16 P500 Basalt, a missile extremely difficult to intercept thanks to its mach3 speed and capable of sinking anything but an aircraft carrier with one hit due to its 1-ton conventional or nuclear warhead. Their range enabled them to engage a surface fleet over 500 km away, thanks to external targeting (aircraft or satellites).
This Russian answer to a US carrier wing could deliver a terrible blow to a NATO surface group especially if it could be coordinated with Missiles launched from submarines or with a raid of TU22 backfire bombers.
Anti-submarine warfare
Although not its primary mission, the Slava class was equipped with the standard Russian anti-submarine defence system; the 2 RBU 6000 anti-submarine rocket launchers and 10 torpedoes, as well as the Ka 25/27 helicopter.
In the event of war in the 80s, it is highly likely that these ships, had they dared to set sail too far away from their defensive bastion, would have quickly fallen victim to Western submarines whose purpose was to engage any Soviet surface group as far North as possible. Western submarine services still enjoyed a significant technological advantage and were perfectly capable of crippling any Soviet fleet.
Electronic warfare
On paper, this vessel is equipped with extensive active and passive detection systems, radar jammers and decoy launchers. We have no information to date on the use of its electronic defence systems, which would certainly have been detected by the numerous ELINT assets in the region.
However, it is clear that these systems were not sufficiently effective given the fate of the ship.
Soviet-era relics, the Achilles heel of the Russian fleet
The tragedy of the Kursk submarine during the first naval exercise of the post-Soviet era in 2000 was a sad revelation of the decay of the Russian navy. In order to maintain its status as a great power, Russia decided to keep most of the large vessels it had inherited from the Soviet era in service. The Kirov and Slava cruisers, the Kuznetsov aircraft carrier and the Udaloy anti-submarine destroyers are all approaching 40 years in service!
Ukraine's independence in 1991, and the influence of the USA on its internal politics for the past 30 years, have certainly been a major factor in the poor reliability of the Russian navy. Ironically, Ukrainian shipyards produced most of the large Soviet ships, and Ukrainian industry was the main source of propulsion turbines for large Russian ships and helicopters.
Maintaining these capital ships consumes large amounts of human and financial resources, and they have shown their limitations during recent operations (see articles on the Kuznetsov).
The Moskva did not receive the firefighting upgrades during her 2018 limited modernisation. This cost-saving decision was very likely a key factor in the loss of this vessel.
Western sailors have long considered that Soviet/Russian ships do not benefit from adequate fire-fighting systems, given the extremely large quantity of explosives on board. The aluminium used in their construction has a tendency to melt under high temperatures, making the presence of effective fire-fighting equipment indispensable.
The fire on the frigate HMS Amazon and the cruiser USS Belknap in the 1970s revealed to Nato's navies the embarrassing consequences of its widespread use.
Over the past 30 years, Russian shipyards have managed to maintain their expertise in submarine construction, but have only been able to produce a handful of frigates (3 Admiral Gorshkov type).
Moskva operational history
Since its commissioning in the early 80s, the Moskva has mainly been used in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. She has only made 2 trips to the Atlantic; once for a cruise to Cuba, and the second time for a visit to Luanda, the capital of Angola.
The last 15 years have been relatively busy, with the ship being involved in 3 different operations.
2008, operation against Georgia
The Moskva took part in the blockade of the port and according to some reports, the Georgian navy managed to damage it, either with missile fire or artillery, but this has never been confirmed by images or official reports.
2015 Syria
The Moskva was used as an air defence system for the port of Latakia in Syria to support Russian operations against ISIS.
2022 Ukrainian conflict
From early February 2022, the Moskva was used to secure airspace close to the Ukrainian coast in support of the Russian invasion. The ship played an important role in the initial capture of Snake Island, a small islet of land relatively close to the Ukrainian coast, enabling the Russians to threaten sea and air traffic off the port of Odessa.
It was during one of these patrols that, 2 months later, Ukrainian forces managed to hit the Moskva with 2 Neptune sea-skimming anti-ship missiles, an evolution of the Russian KH35, updated by the Ukrainian Luch design bureau.
The Moskva should have been capable of defending herself against missiles of the same class as the infamous Exocet.
Not ready for this war?
As the Moskva had only intermittent air cover, it almost certainly sailed with air search radar switched on, giving the Ukrainian the opportunity to plot her position easily (thanks to drones or a US maritime patrol plane, for example...) and transmit its coordinates to a coastal missile battery within engagement range.
Over-the-horizon radar detection using EM wave bouncing in the surface duct has also been mentioned (Monolith type radar).
Some reports speak of the ship's predictable navigation, others that the detection radars were not switched on, which for a ship whose main mission is air defence, would be like going into a fight blindfolded and with her arms tied behind her back...
It's also possible that poor weather conditions made it difficult to detect missiles flying at very low altitudes (1 to 3 meters). The ship's combat system, if it dates from the late ‘80s or even ‘90s, may not be equipped with automated consoles, essential to help operators who may be tired, to react quickly enough in the event of a missile attack.
Even the most modern Russian hardware has never been equipped with a particularly optimised user interface.
Having built the Moskva, it's quite conceivable that the Ukrainians have equipped the Neptune missiles with passive guidance systems (Optical) that cannot be detected by the Moskva on-board systems (pure speculation on my part).
No information seems to be available to date on any defensive reaction from the ship; the surprise may have been total, as with the HMS Sheffield or the USS Stark.
Crew training?
The human aspect is also essential. Soviet/Russian exercises have long been highly scripted, aimed at developing the automatisms required by highly rigid doctrines of employment. During an anti-missile exercise, the crew will be warned in advance of the number of missiles, the time of the attack and its origin.
This method of learning does not develop initiative or the ability to react to unexpected situations.
The only certainty is that a properly maintained 12,000-ton, well-equipped cruiser, should have been able to intercept 2 subsonic missiles, a number far too small to overwhelm its defences. But the crew should also have been able to control the damage and the fires. Savings made by not upgrading fire-fighting systems certainly played a part.
The crew of the USS Stark, a ship 3 times smaller, hit by 2 Exocets, put out the fire without help and returned to port despite significant damage and casualties, thanks to a well-trained crew equipped with good firefighting equipment.
These Russian monsters, which once made Western navies tremble, are now totally unsuited to operations in highly contested environments. This will probably condemn them to the scrapyards unless they undergo major modernisation, which is highly unlikely, given the enormous losses the Russians will have to replace after the conflict.
However spectacular, the loss of this ship had little impact on the ground operations and should not obscure the fact that the Russian navy still possesses many modern offensive weapons, but they are mainly deployed by its submarines and a few smaller, more recent vessels (corvettes and frigates). The Russian Navy will very likely turn its back on these very expensive ships and focus on smaller capable corvette for coastal operation and on their submarine for blue water operation.
Sources
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2022/may/6/anti-missile-radars-not-working-russian-ship-moskv/
Warships International Fleet Review June 2022 (articles by Ian Ballantyne, Dr James Bosbotinis)
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/02/russian-navy-slava-class-cruiser-moskva-to-serve-another-10-years/
https://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-russia-navy-ambitions-20151116-story.html
Aluminium at sea
https://www.nytimes.com/1982/07/03/opinion/l-aluminum-s-not-to-blame-for-warship-loss-251244.html
