Russian Operation in Syria: Key learnings

Between obsolescence and rebirth

Article written in December 2021 before the Ukrainian war

Soviet fleet mid 80’

It is important to understand that Russia emerged from the Cold War ruined, and humiliated, with its seat at the Security Council contested.

The situation in the Middle East will give Putin a unique opportunity to get back into the great diplomatic game, but also to restore the pride of the Russian people through his armed forces.

At the dawn of the 21st century, they are demoralised following conflicts and accidents since the mid-1980s which have been calamitous for its image (Afghanistan, Chechnya, Georgia, the explosion of the Kursk, etc.).

It was necessary, after a decade without proper funding, to modernise equipment and train soldiers properly.

But Russia no longer has the financial means or the innovation capabilities of the Soviet Union. Limited budgets need to be assigned according to the following priorities:

• Rebuilding a credible nuclear deterrent force, with the new SSBN Borei, SSGN Yasen, protected by renovated SNA Sierra / Akula. The Russian expertise in submarines is still recognised internationally.

• Upgrading its strategic aviation bombers (engines and navigation systems of the Tu 160 and Tu 95) which still have lots of flying hours left, despite most of them being built in the 80’s.

• Investing in disruptive technologies in areas neglected by NATO forces, by eventually deploying cold war projects (anti-ship/hypersonic tactical missiles, anti-satellite weapons, cyber weapons, specialised submarines, Poseidon nuclear torpedoes).

• Upgrading part of the air, land and naval assets placed in reserve in the 90s, available in large numbers and still efficient for local interventions against tier 2 foes.

For Vladimir Putin, the independence of Ukraine and its rapprochement with NATO were the point of no return. Ukraine occupied an important place in the logistics chain of the Soviet/Russian armies. Russia was dependent on transport aircraft reactors, helicopter and ship turbines. This industrial hold-up, which the Russians believe was planned by NATO to weaken them, resulted in a significant drop in the availability of existing equipment, but also the impossibility for the Russian navy to design surface ships of more than 3000 tons for almost 25 years.

If the invasion of Crimea was the first step in the return of the big Russian Bear on the international scene, the intervention in Syria was the most spectacular and beneficial for its image.

Since 2015, Russia has been intervening in Syria with a significant ground force but with hardware mostly built in Soviet time; budgetary constraints did not allow the acquisition of sufficient recent equipment, with some exceptions.

VKS Air Force

The Russian Air Force deployed everything it had for its pilots and ground crew to gain operational experience. Legacy Su24 Su25 and a few more modern Su30, Su34, Su35 and even 2 Su 57 prototypes for 48 hours. It is interesting to note that even the most recent aircraft have been used mostly with conventional ammunition (rockets, unguided bombs).

While NATO used almost only "smart" laser or GPS-guided ammunition, the Russian forces relied almost exclusively on the old-school carpet bombing technique for close air support missions. The main reason seems to be the lack of reliable targeting device (designator pod) even on the most modern aircraft.

The inexistent surface-to-air missile threat, allowed Su 24s and the recent Su 34s alongside the massive Tu 22 Backfires to drop conventional and cluster bombs. The Russians being less concerned with negative repercussions in their media in the event of collateral damage, can afford to save the use of expensive “surgical” munitions essential to NATO's “clean” wars.

The available information seems to confirm that Russian forces are 30 years behind NATO in targeting capabilities. NATO observation/orient/decision/action (OODA) loop, is carried out almost in real-time (L16 transmission, satellites, drones…).

This approach still certainly guaranteed good results at low cost, compensating for the lack of precision with the number of ammunition, but it did not prepare them well enough for the Ukrainian integrated air defence system, they would have to confront a few years later.

The following events can be used to characterise the strengths and weaknesses NATO witnessed during the Russian intervention.

-Su 24 shot down by Turkish forces:

The involuntary incursion of the Russian Su 24 into Turkish airspace during a bombing pass was explained by obsolete radio and navigation equipment not allowing Russian pilots to receive warning calls from Turkish air defence. The Turkish F16 shot one AIM120 at the SU 24 after multiple warning, destroying the aircraft and killing one crew member.

-Il 20 Elint aircraft Lost to Syrian Air defence

During or right after an Israeli Strike, the Syrian Air defence engaged a Russian air force ELINT Aircraft with an SA 5 long-range SAM.
Blue-on-blue incident is not uncommon even in the West, but it certainly demonstrates a lack of coordination between Syria and Russia. Also, it shows poor EW capabilities of the Russian aircraft against an old (if not obsolete) system, they should know everything about!!!

-Russian cruise missile launches:

Russia has made enormous efforts to deploy modern cruise missile firing platforms, an area where they have long-standing expertise but little operational experience.
Tu 160 Blackjack and Tu95 fired cruise missiles after well-publicised, long-range flights shadowed by multiple NATO fighter escorts (departure from Angels base via the North Atlantic and Gibraltar).

It seems that the real objective was a media coup. Russia was determined to demonstrate its know-how in order to promote, with some success, the equipment used to its potential customers (Algeria, Egypt, Turkey).

-Role of the Russian fleet

The Russian Navy has succeeded in mobilising a significant number of vessels for very diverse missions:

• Noria of supply ships for men and hardware (between harbours of the Black Sea and Tartous),

• Area control and air defence, with one Slava-type cruiser (equipped with long-range SAMs) and Udaloy-type ASM destroyer. These ships are old but still have significant capabilities.

Slava class Cruiser

The aircraft carrier Kutznetzov and her accompanying fleet made a highly publicised cruise, despite questionable military value. This old ship is poorly maintained and is known for its engine problems (hence the permanent presence of an ocean-going tug with every cruise). Her air group is only capable of carrying out air-to-air missions due to the lack of catapult on this ship (STOBAR configured).

Once again, this was more of a prestige cruise (Russia is back!).

The offensive missions were carried out by the Navy diesel-electric Kilo-type submarine and the brand new light frigates recently commissioned.

These ships fired numerous cruise missiles at targets in Syria and Iraq. The Krasnodar submarine (Kilo) also perfectly played its role as a scarecrow for NATO's surface fleet, which was very happy to rediscover a capable foe to justify the existence of its anti-submarine fleet under used for many years.

Conclusion

Russian action both diplomatically and military appears to have been successful. The Syrian government is still in place, the threat of the Islamic State is suppressed and the Russian military presence in the region is secured for many years, all this at a completely acceptable cost (human, material and financial) for the Russian Government. But many shortcomings vis-à-vis NATO forces have come to light, when one looks at Russian tactics and how some of the 19 combat aircrafts were lost.

Over the past 20 years, the Russians have rebuilt a motivated and much better trained army, but without enough budget for them to deploy new equipment in sufficient quantities to modernise its offensive forces (air and naval).

Its clever management of the large stocks, produced during the Soviet Union, allows Russia to have a decent number of units on paper which, even if they represent only a small fraction of the Soviet firepower of the 80s, are sufficient for NATO countries to be worried; while European NATO members have discarded between 60 to 70% of their respective armies and have concentrated their entire budget on the purchase of costly ultra-modern equipment, only available in homoeopathic doses.

However, one crucial factor is to be remembered; the lack of tanker and command and control planes available to the VKS in sufficient numbers. Without them no large-scale air campaign is possible.

NATO has several hundred tankers available; Russia has less than 20. This makes it only possible to classify Russia as a regional power, certainly credible, but with mainly defensive capabilities (nuclear and conventional).

NATO's air forces are, on paper, much more powerful, but the recent reinvestment of all its members in conventional ground forces is a sign of concern about their capabilities to stop Russia in case it makes an aggressive move to regain control over its neighbours.

This new diplomatic situation is in itself a victory for Putin, whose objective is above all to regain respect. As Andrei Gratchev, Gorbachev's last spokesman, said, "Putin knows that Russia is only listened to by the West when she scares them”.